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ABSTRACT 
 
Excluded from “the national order of things” refugees live under specific forms of 
control. Similarly, those citizens that the state considers as potential or real “enemies of 
the nation” live under forms of control that do not apply to other citizens. Using the 
paired comparison of a Palestinian refugee camp in the West Bank and the Palestinian 
districts of an Israeli city, this article argues that a focus on control can help break the 
strict analytical dichotomy between cities and camps and between citizens and refugees. 
It draws attention to the role of agencies of control ranging from humanitarian 
organizations to policing agencies in shaping how marginalized refugees and citizens 
negotiate access to scarce material and symbolic resources. In the process, it shows how 
the forms that political engagement takes in the city and the camp challenge fixed notions 
of citizenship, cities, and camps—for example, the notion that citizenship status and 
cities are inherently politically empowering while refugee status and camps are inherently 
depoliticizing.  
 
Key Words: refugee camp inhabitants; the urban poor; citizenship; humanitarian 
government; policing, security and military agencies; politics 
 
 
 
Word Count: 7116 
 
                                                        
* I would like to thank Giovanni Picker for thoughtful comments on different drafts of this article. I would 
also like to thank Hanna Bauman and Michele Lancione for inviting me to present a previous version of 
this article at the 2014-2015 City Seminar at the University of Cambridge. Most of all, I am deeply grateful 
to all the Palestinian women and men in the Jalazon camp and in Lod who made my research possible. 
Funding for this research came from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation and a National Science 
Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant, as well as the following institutions at UC Berkeley: 
the Department of Sociology, the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, the Center for Race and Gender, the 
Center for the Study of Law & Society, and the Institute for International Studies. 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Refugee camps do just that: they remove evidence of human displacement from view and 
contain “the problem” without resolution, as noncommunities of the excluded. 
- Jennifer Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of 
Humanitarianism (2000) 
 
The city is a crucial condition of citizenship in the sense that being a citizen is 
inextricably associated with being of the city. 
- Engin Isin, Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship (2000) 
 
 
Introduction 
Scholars of the state and urban scholars disagree about the relative salience of the state 
and the city in shaping modalities of political action (Rodgers, Barnett, and Cochrane 
2014). Yet, they converge on the conceptualization of refugees and refugee camps as 
standing at one pole of the political and urban spectrum with citizens and cities at the 
other pole. This opposition is typically centered on fixed experiential notions of 
citizenship, cities, and camps, especially political ones——for example, the notion that 
citizenship status and cities are inherently politically empowering while refugee status 
and camps are inherently depoliticizing (Sanyal 2011, 879). Arendt’s (1973, 297) 
understanding of refugees as people that have lost a protective political community and 
Agamben’s ([1995] 1998) view of camps as spaces that extinguish political life constitute 
the main intellectual anchors for this conceptualization of refugees and refugee camps in 
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negative terms (e.g. Hyndman 2000; Hanafi and Long 2010). Agier’s (2002) call for “an 
urban ethnography” of camps has convincingly connected refugees and urban spaces, but 
it has left mostly untouched the political contents usually attributed to concepts of 
citizenship, cities, and camps. Indeed, while opening up a new important line of research 
on refugees and cities, the debate generated by Agier’s urban approach to camps has 
reproduced the dominant thinking with regard to refugees and refugee camps as 
“missing” some urban or political parts. In other words, camps are unfinished cities 
(Agier 2002, 337), spaces that, unlike cities, do not “entail expectations of citizenship” 
(Malkki 2002, 355), or again camps, unlike cities, are “‘total institutions’…from which 
there is no escape” (Bauman 2002, 347).  
Recent works have problematized this negative approach to camps and 
conceptualized them as political spaces and their inhabitants as political agents (e.g. 
Ramadan 2012; Grbac 2013; Redclift 2013; Sigona 2015). These works have extended 
the same conceptual language and analytic approaches to the camps that had been 
developed with regard to the city and the state. Thus, for example, Gbrac has argued in 
favor of “a right to the camp” approach, which is parallel to the “right to the city” 
approach, and Sigona has used the term “campzenship,” a clear parallel to “citizenship,” 
to address issues of political agency within camps. While this “political” turn in the study 
of camps has effectively destabilized the status of passivity and victimhood typically 
attached to camps, it has not as effectively challenged the privileged position of cities as 
political sites and citizens as political agents. However, understanding the variety of 
political practices and meanings that emerge among marginalized populations, whether 
they live in camps or in cities, requires challenging both poles of the urban and political 
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spectrum. In other words, scholars must problematize the fixed notions attached to camps 
as well as those attached to state citizenship and to cities (Sanyal 2012, 2014).  
Using the paired comparison of a Palestinian refugee camp in the West Bank and the 
Palestinian districts of an Israeli city, this article argues that a focus on the sociolegal 
control exercised by the institutions of the ruling power and enshrined in its legal norms 
and dominant discourses can help break the strict analytical dichotomy between cities and 
camps and between citizens and refugees.1  It draws attention to the role of agencies of 
control ranging from humanitarian organizations to policing agencies in shaping how 
marginalized Palestinian refugees and urban citizens2 negotiate access to scarce material 
and symbolic resources. In the process, it shows how the forms that political engagement 
takes in the city and the camp challenge fixed notions of citizenship, cities, and camps.  
Palestinian refugees and urban citizens live within a broader colonial-like context that 
cannot be understood through a reductive opposition between symbolic-political practices 
and material practices (Abourahme 2011, 2014). Yet without discarding the complexities 
of meaning and action that characterize the experiences of subordinated Palestinians in 
West Bank refugee camps and Israeli cities, my comparative analysis3 shows how, in 
their respective struggle for scarce symbolic and material resources, camp inhabitants 
routinely use visible and collective forms of action while urban residents are hesitant to 
become political in the public sphere and therefore pursue more underground forms of 
action. I argue that understanding refugees’ relatively strong propensity toward collective 
forms of action and urban citizens’ equally strong propensity towards individualized 
modalities of action outside public and official arenas requires an analysis of their 
relationships with distinct agencies of control—specifically, UNRWA (the United 
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Nations Relief and Work Agency), the Israeli army, and more recently, the PA 
(Palestinian Authority) in the case of camp dwellers and the Israeli policing and security 
agencies in the case of urban citizens. 
Rather than starting from the ultimately problematic assumption that refugee camps 
are incomplete urban or political configurations, this article begins with the fact that, like 
marginalized urban citizens, refugees negotiate their access to scarce material and 
symbolic resources in the context of powerful agencies of control. It suggests that a 
comparative approach centered on these different agencies of control has valuable power 
to shed light on the variation in political meanings and practices among subordinated 
people. Ultimately, the paper argues that in order to go beyond thinking in terms of the 
static idea that “cities and citizens” are necessarily privileged over “camps and refugees,” 
a comparative approach to how control is negotiated in everyday life is imperative.  
The article first discusses how a focus on the forms of control that refugees and the 
urban poor experience helps problematize fixed notions of citizenship, cities, and camps. 
Second, it gives a historical-legal overview of the various forms of control that have been 
imposed on Palestinian refugees and urban citizens. Third, it examines an instance of 
associational action in the camp and one of communal frailty in the urban district. These 
instances illustrate how the dominant thinking about cities and citizenship being in 
opposition to camps and refugee status falls short of explaining the variation in practices 
and meanings among subordinated people across legal statuses and places. The 
conclusion discusses the implications of this article for the study of refugees in 
comparison to the inhabitants of other camp formations as well as to the urban poor.4 
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Challenging Fixed Notions of Camps, Cities, and Citizenship: A Focus on Agencies 
of Control 
Excluded from “the national order of things” refugees live under specific forms of 
control. Similarly, those citizens that the state considers as potential or real “enemies of 
the nation” live under forms of control that do not apply to other citizens. Sanyal’s (2011, 
2012, 2014) urban approach to refugees offers a solid point of departure for comparing 
refugees and the urban poor. She shows that, like their urban counterparts, refugees 
actively shape the space around them through informal spatial practices such as squatting. 
While she does not look systematically at the forms of control experienced by refugees 
and the urban poor, her comparative approach pushes her to ask a series of provocative 
questions in this regard: “Could it be possible to imagine refugees as privileged in 
comparison to the urban poor? Does the presence of a global sovereign (humanitarian 
protection) and its constant negotiation with the host governments (where it is allowed to 
operate) not provide [refugees with] a layer of protection that the poor do not have?” 
(Sanyal 2012, 64). While “practical” notions of citizenship emphasize how state 
citizenship can be “hollowed” from within by systems of domination, for example along 
racial lines, the scholarship on refugees often implicitly compares them to citizens, 
emphasizing how they lack a fundamental protective layer within contemporary societies: 
legal citizenship. Sanyal’s provocative question turns this assumption on its head, 
suggesting that, for marginalized populations, refugee status can operate as a more 
effective protective layer than legal citizenship. 
In this article, I do not conceptualize Palestinian refugee camp dwellers as “privileged 
in comparison to” their urban citizen counterparts—an assumption that in my view is as 
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static as the dominant notion of legal citizenship as a protective layer against 
dispossession and dehumanization. Yet, I do discuss how the inclusion of a humanitarian 
agency in the configuration of control at work in the camp on the one hand, and the 
pervasive presence of Israeli policing and security agencies in the city on the other, play a 
crucial role in differentiating how Palestinian refugees and the Palestinian urban poor 
maneuver to obtain scarce material and symbolic resources. Put differently, I do draw 
attention to an important difference between the various forms of control imposed on 
“unwanted” populations: the presence of humanitarian organizations in the refugee camps 
of the Global South (e.g. Agier 2011; Fassin 2012), and the prominent role of the 
coercive agencies of the state in the lives of the urban poor in both the Global South and 
the Global North (e.g. Graham 2010; Wacquant 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2014; Fassin 2013). 
I speak here about a tendency, not a clear-cut dichotomy. Of course, military, security, 
and policing agencies can and often do intervene in refugee camps and welfare agencies 
and NGOs can and often are present in the lives of the urban poor. Further, in addition to 
heavily controlled populations, there are also populations that are “abandoned” rather 
than controlled by the state or other ruling agencies. Yet, refugee populations tend to 
establish protracted relationships with humanitarian agencies while the urban poor are 
more likely to negotiate protracted relationships with the law-enforcement and security 
agencies. 
As argued by sociologists of punishment and critical criminologists, far from 
operating merely as imposed external domination, the control exercised by the state and 
other ruling agencies deeply shapes the terrain on which marginalized populations 
maneuver to improve their living conditions and to formulate their social and political 
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claims (e.g. Wacquant 2009; Palidda 2009). The salience of practices of state control for 
the study of marginalized populations, whether they live in camps or cities, also emerges 
from both the colonial and the contemporary urban literature (see Pasquetti 2012, on the 
distribution of forms of control in the Israeli-Palestinian case) . For example, in his model 
of bifurcated legal rule in colonial South Africa, Mamdani (1996) examines how the legal 
apparatus of the colonial state differentiated between urban blacks living in the townships 
and rural blacks living on the reservations. It also regulated rural black workers moving 
to the cities via a system of travel permits, obliging them to stay in urban hostels that 
were separated from the townships. He argues that this bifurcated colonial regime of legal 
rule effectively created distinct political expressions and practices among urban and rural 
subjects and produced distinct forms of organizing within the different spatial 
configurations of urban townships, rural reservations and urban hostels for rural workers. 
While Mamdani’s model of bifurcated control centers on the law—the distinction 
between citizens and subjects—the literature on urban control in the West has a more 
developed spatial dimension and identifies the emergence of illiberal pockets of control 
within Western cities as well as the role of “brutal top-down control measures” in the 
management of those at the bottom of the social order. As Scheerer and Hess (1997, 130) 
put it: “internal polarization of [Western post-industrial] societies and the creation of an 
ever-deepening gap between the fortresses of the affluent and the migrating miserable 
masses are developments that are resulting in a marked bifurcation of control styles. The 
prospects are normalization and de-institutionalization for the ‘in-groups’ and an 
increasing brutalization at the margins for the ‘out-groups.’” 
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In addition to these insights on the productivity and differentiation of control, I draw 
on Fraser’s (2010) approach to “social exclusion” as a key reference in my effort to de-
essentialize both camps and cities, viewing both of them as socio-spatial configurations 
that are shaped by continuous processes of negotiation over material and symbolic 
resources. Fraser identifies three mechanisms of exclusion: a cultural denial of respect 
and recognition; an economic denial of resources; and a political denial of participation in 
decision-making. She highlights how these axes might intersect and combine to further 
entrench social exclusion in a multiplicity of arenas. Along these lines, contestation might 
also take different shapes and act in different arenas at the same time. Drawing on this 
intersectional definition of exclusion, I show how humanitarian organizations in the camp 
and policing and security agencies in the city mediate the processes of negotiation over 
material and symbolic resources in the two localities in ways that question what the 
literature largely suggests as the static difference between cities and camps.  
 
A Brief History of Displacement and Control 
Lod and the Jalazon camp are historically connected. The 1948 war, which led to the 
establishment of the Israeli state and turned hundreds of thousands of Palestinians into 
refugees, caused a demographic-upheaval in Lydda (renamed Lod in the new Israeli 
state) and led to the creation of the Jalazon camp. In July of 1948, the Israeli army 
occupied the city and expelled about 50,000 Palestinian residents—including 22,000 
regular inhabitants and a roughly equal number of rural Palestinians who had found 
refuge in the city. Expelled Palestinians left Lydda on foot and those who survived the 
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trek became refugees in the Jalazon camp and in other camps in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip. 
Since this mass displacement that transformed Lydda into the Jewish Israeli city of 
Lod and pushed almost all of its former Palestinian inhabitants into camps, urban 
Palestinian minorities in Lod and Palestinian refugees in the Jalazon camp have 
experienced distinct forms of control. Like the other Palestinians (about 150,000) that 
managed to remain inside the newly established Israeli state, the roughly 1,000 remaining 
Palestinians in Lydda-Lod5 were simultaneously given citizenship and put under military 
rule. For close to a year, they were forced into two fenced-in areas of the city—one in the 
old city and one in a Western district of the city—and they could only leave with permits 
(Yacobi 2009, 33-35). While all-Arab towns and villages inside Israel remained under 
military rule until 1966, the military restrictions in Lod were eased in May 1949 due to 
the very low number of Palestinians there and the emptied city’s planned absorption of 
tens of thousands of Jewish migrants. Indeed, in the 1950s and 1960s, newly arrived 
Jewish migrants who turned into Israeli citizens constituted about 90 per cent of the city’s 
population while the number of urban Palestinians remained the same. However, due to 
internal migration in the 1970s, the Palestinian population began to increase and has 
steadily grown to reach about 25 per cent of the city’s total population as of today.  
The recomposition of the Palestinian population in Lod has been accompanied by 
state and public discourses about Palestinians in the city as a demographic-cum-security 
threat to their Jewish-Israeli counterparts and by practices of control, which target them 
as a “suspect population” to be monitored and rendered legible to state scrutiny. These 
practices have included, and continue to include today, the widespread use of police 
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informers and the police’s logistical support of security agencies and the underground 
activities these agencies use to identify, arrest, and interrogate “political troublemakers.”  
In his historical account of the formation of the securitized regime of control imposed 
over Palestinians in Israel from 1948 to 1966, Cohen (2010, 235) describes it in this way: 
“one of their [the informers’] central mission … was to report all nationalist sentiments 
they heard expressed in their villages and cities … The result was a comprehensive 
system of reports from informers … It was a carefully calculated system through which 
the security agencies tried to ‘educate’ Arab citizens in what they were permitted and 
what they were forbidden to say.” As I discuss below, the monopoly of control that the 
Israeli security agencies have exercised over Palestinian citizens of Israel is still very 
much at work today in the Arab districts of Lod. 
While the Israeli state has historically woven a securitized regime of control around 
its Palestinian citizens based on the recruitment of informers and the convergence 
between policing and security agencies, since 1948 Palestinian refugees in the West Bank 
have negotiated their lives in connection with two strikingly different types of 
institutions: humanitarian organizations—particularly UNRWA (the United Nations 
Relief and Welfare Agency)6—and military powers—first the Jordanian army (1948-
1967) and then the Israeli army (since 1967).7 More recently, the establishment of the PA 
(Palestinian Authority)—an authority of semi-autonomous rule in the West Bank’s urban 
centers—has added an additional third layer to the institutions that refugees must 
routinely navigate. Thus, in the case of Palestinian refugee camps, “control, more than in 
other contexts, is partial and in [a] continual process of definition. No monopoly of 
control exists” (Abourahme and Hilal 2009, 10-11).  
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In particular, the protracted interplay between military and humanitarian agencies has 
been particularly consequential for how Palestinian camp inhabitants have struggled to 
obtain material and symbolic resources. From the very beginning, Palestinian refugees 
have perceived UNRWA as a tool used by mainly Western international donors to reduce 
the unsolved question of their political rights to a “problem” of poverty and 
unemployment. Thus, the first generation of refugees compared UNRWA to a “narcotics 
castle” and its services to the “giving of a shot of morphine” (Rempel 2009, 418) aimed 
to convince them to accept “resettlement” (tawteen) while most of them clearly preferred 
to return to their villages and homes.  
Yet, over time, refugees have also found UNRWA to be permeable to their demands, 
especially as UNRWA hired thousands of them to work in its bureaucratic apparatus, its 
schools, and its social service departments. As Farah (2010, 391) puts it, the Palestinian 
refugees working for UNRWA “are the glue that binds refugees to the organization and 
they blur the boundary between benefactor and beneficiary.” UNRWA also became more 
open to refugees’ concerns and desires. One example is UNRWA’s support of the 
establishment of “Youth Centers” in all the refugee camps, which became another 
important arena for collective cultural and political activities inside the camps. Thus, 
despite refugees’ initial mistrust, UNRWA has emerged over the decades as an 
institutional layer operating as a protective shield for the reorganization of the collective 
life of camp inhabitants. Embedded in an everyday reality marked by the Israeli army’s 
attacks on camp inhabitants and their built-environment and by expanding Israeli 
settlements (Handel 2014), refugees have come to perceive and use the presence of 
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UNRWA as a both a buffer institution against military repression and an arena for the 
articulation of their own claims and projects.  
 
Camp Collective Action and Urban Communal Frailty: Some Counterintuitive 
Findings 
Studied together, the modalities of action prevailing among the Palestinian urban poor in 
Lod, on the one hand, and the Palestinian refugees in the Jalazon, on the other, contradict 
the idea of refugee camps as “noncommunities” and cities as quintessential incubators of 
associational life and collective politics. Indeed, the Palestinian urban poor in Lod are 
closer than the Palestinian refugees in the Jalazon camp to Hyndman’s “noncommunities 
of the excluded” while the latter engage more explicitly and effectively than the former in 
associational modalities of action that, since Weber’s ([1921] 1966)([1921] 1960) The 
City, scholars have seen as core features of urban life (e.g. Holston and Appadurai 1996; 
Isin 2000).  
A comparison of the differing dispositions that camp and city inhabitants display 
toward collective modalities of action reveals how humanitarian and security practices of 
control deeply shape how inhabitants of the camp and the city respectively negotiate over 
scarce material and symbolic resources. Put differently, the protracted relationships that 
Palestinian refugees and urban citizens have established with different agencies of control 
mediate how these two segments of “the global poor” (Fraser 2010, 363) act upon their 
respective conditions of material-cultural-political exclusion. 
The role that agencies of control play in the day-to-day struggle for material and 
symbolic resources can be gleaned from how they reacted to my presence as a foreign 
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researcher among them. Palestinian camp inhabitants quickly normalized my presence in 
the camp as a member of the broader “humanitarian” typology of people that they 
routinely encounter, for example foreign volunteers. As such, they actively and 
collectively sought my help to write grants for several cultural centers inside the camp, to 
encourage foreign delegations to support some of the camp institutions, and to write 
reports to foreign donors. By contrast, urban Palestinians in Lod routinely expressed an 
uneasy surprise about my interest in their everyday lives, stating that “the police” rather 
than “foreign students” are those who typically express interest in and scrutinize their 
lives. They worried that my presence could intensify the state scrutiny of their lives and 
jeopardize their individualized day-to-day struggles over scarce resources. As this brief 
note about my field presence illustrates, humanitarian practices in the camp and policing 
and security practices in the city highly affect camp inhabitants’ and urban residents’ 
everyday thinking about the mostly hostile environment around them and how they might 
act upon it in order to extract from it much needed resources. 
On the one hand, camp inhabitants have developed a disposition to deal with issues of 
scarce material and symbolic resources collectively through the creation of associations 
and the organization of protests. They routinely turn to the ethos of “community” when 
they deal with issues such as unemployment or education: “the ethos [of community] lies 
in addressing social problems that affect a group by seeing the group as a community 
that, because it is harmed collectively, is best helped through collective response” 
(Collins 2010, 16). They mobilize “the language of community …not as a knee-jerk 
resistance to social change, but rather as a political tool for protecting families and 
neighborhoods” (Collins 2010, 15).  
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While each layer of control plays a mediating and interactive role in the emergence of 
this disposition toward collective action, camp inhabitants’ access to scarce resources via 
their relationship with UNRWA is a particularly important site for the elaboration of 
collective claims. Indeed, camp inhabitants have engaged with UNRWA over decades to 
deepen its accountability toward them.  
Through their relationship with UNRWA, camp inhabitants act upon all three 
dimensions of Fraser’s definition of “social exclusion:” redistribution, recognition, and 
representation. This link between claims of access to material resources, claims of 
collective identity recognition and claims of political participation was evident in the 
wave of protests against some proposed cuts in UNRWA’s services that took place in 
2007-2008 in the Jalazon camp as well as other West Bank camps. In the Jalazon camp, 
the protests included a one-day occupation of a UNRWA office in the nearby city of 
Ramallah. Standing in the parking lot of the occupied building, I joined a dozen women 
from Jalazon who approached a UNRWA truck parked in a corner of the parking lot. 
Two women climbed the high back of the truck and attempted to open the closed back 
door. Laughing, they said that they wanted to see if “they [UNRWA] hid food from us 
[refugees].” These women remained in the parking lot the whole time and spoke about 
the rising price of bread and other basic foods. They spoke about how UNRWA was 
responsible for protecting refugees from the threat of “starvation.” At the same time, 
other refugees stood in front of the building’s entrance holding a banner with the 
following message: “the people of the Jalazon camp demand UNRWA respect their rights 
and fulfill its responsibilities toward them.” Still other camp men and women entered and 
occupied the building. When I joined them, I noticed how the different layers of authority 
 16 
from the camp, including some members of the camp’s popular committee, the 
representatives of various camp institutions, and groups of elderly, were all present and 
took turns speaking about Palestinian refugees’ historical dispossession and international 
responsibilities as much as about the rising price of food and the cuts to UNRWA’s 
services (see also Pasquetti 2011). 
These protests were intrinsically not only about the distribution of resources but also 
about the protection of a specific narrative of dispossession and about the attribution of 
political responsibility to international state actors for the predicament of marginality 
experienced by the camp inhabitants. The fundamental logic of this link between 
(material) redistribution and (political) recognition/participation in the eyes of camp 
inhabitants is that unfulfilled practical needs can lead to infighting inside the camp and to 
the development of individualized alternatives to collective problem-solving. The 
backdrop of the protracted military occupation reinforces camp inhabitants’ sense of 
urgency for protecting the flow of resources received from UNRWA and for finding 
formulas that guarantee a level of fairness in their distribution within the camp. To sum 
up, far from being a depoliticized “noncommunity,” camp inhabitants are oriented toward 
associational modalities of action and routinely connect their day-to-day struggle against 
material deprivation to their struggle against the two other forms of exclusion identified 
by Fraser: the symbolic-cultural denial of recognition and the political denial of 
participation. 
While Palestinian refugees of the Jalazon camp actively and collectively maneuver 
within and gradually expand the space created by the different layers of control, 
especially by the interplay between humanitarianism and military aggression, the 
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monopoly of control established by the Israeli state’s security apparatus shrinks the space 
of maneuver available to poor Palestinians in Lod. In their case, the struggle against 
material deprivation is individualized and stands in tension with, if not at times in 
opposition to, the struggle for symbolic recognition and political participation, which, 
instead, are often identified as two key features of urban political configurations. 
Like the urban poor in other parts of the world, poor Palestinians in Lod engage in 
informal practices in various realms of life such as housing and employment. About 50 
per cent of them live in illegal structures. This is due to the “ethnocratic”8 logic of urban 
planning in the city, which constructs their presence as a symbolic-demographic threat 
and effectively “illegalizes” their building activities. As their requests for building 
licenses are regularly refused, many Palestinian families build their houses without 
licenses. Many of them also run informal businesses like food stands or second-hand 
clothing stores. Further, criminality and drug dealing are endemic in the segregated 
districts of the city where most of them live. This proximity to informal and “illegal” 
ways of living renders them particularly vulnerable to the securitized forms of monitoring 
that are imposed on them, and perhaps most especially to the recruitment of police 
informers.  
In particular, Palestinians in Lod experience informing not just as a policing practice 
but also as a mechanism that distributes reward and punishment. They think that those 
identified by the authorities as “political troublemakers” are more likely to have their 
informal businesses closed or their makeshift houses demolished. They are also afraid 
that their friends and neighbors will strike a deal by “selling information” to the Israeli 
police at the expense of other Palestinians. Indeed, they believe that police informers and 
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their families are rewarded. As an unemployed resident who failed to obtain a license to 
sell second-hand clothes put it: “If I were to go to the police station right now, they would 
give me the license. I have to become a spy to obtain a [shop] license.” Most Palestinians 
in Lod believe this, though the distribution of rewards and punishment by the security 
apparatus might be more erratic and less intentional that perceived by Palestinian 
residents. Though the fact remains that the perception of the link between informing and 
access to scarce material resources is conducive to a climate of distrust and 
recriminations. It is also conducive to a generalized fear of “speaking politics,” of 
debating collectively about issues of cultural recognition and political participation In the 
words of a middle-aged Palestinian sanitation cleaner: “do you know what they [the 
authorities] want from us? They want us to make good foul, falafel, and hummus, and to 
keep silent.” 
The distrust toward other residents and the fear of being singled out as a political 
activist hinder a collective approach to shared problems such as housing, employment, 
and safety. Distrust and fear frustrate attempts at collective organizing to improve 
material conditions. This is the case of Nisreen (a pseudonym), a woman living in a small 
housing project who had tried to convince other women from the project to join together 
and hold regular meetings to pressure the local authorities to solve the problem of the 
sewage waters that fill the project’s streets, especially in the winter. Remembering her 
efforts, she told me that she was frustrated at herself as well as the other women living in 
the project because they were not determined enough to build on the initial momentum to 
give regularity to their meetings. She said that one by one, many women withdrew from 
the meetings, giving a variety of reasons, including their husbands’ opposition to their 
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participation, lack of time due to work and domestic responsibilities and anxiety about 
becoming visible “public” figures in the project.  
This latter problem is, according to Nisreen, the most serious and difficult problem to 
deal with. With regard to this, she said, “Even if we start to establish a new committee 
again we will face the same obstacles that we had before. People … don’t like to be on 
the summit, or in the first level, they want to be on the second level.” Given the mutual 
distrust among Palestinians living in Lod, those who obtain visibility via direct 
involvement in initiatives such as holding meetings and trying to create committees often 
face the skepticism of other residents who question their motivations. Further, those who 
actively participate in such initiatives worry that their participation will make them more 
vulnerable to state scrutiny because the authorities are likely to interpret this participation 
in collective organizing as a sign of their interest in “politics.” (see Pasquetti 2013, for an 
in-depth study of the climate of distrust and fear among the Palestinian urban poor in 
Lod). 
To sum up, unlike Palestinian camp inhabitants, urban Palestinians experience 
communal frailty and are not disposed toward associational modalities of action. Further, 
while Palestinian refugees elaborate their claims of recognition and participation through 
their day-to-day negotiation over scarce material resources, urban Palestinians’ efforts to 
escape material deprivation frustrate rather than facilitate their expressions of political 
claims while reproducing their extremely uneven power relations with local and state 
authorities, especially law-enforcement agencies (see also Pasquetti 2015). 
 
Conclusion 
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The paired comparison of Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank and urban districts 
in Israeli cities shows that rather than conceptualizing camps as incomplete urban-
political configurations or arguing, instead, that, like cities, camps can be and often are 
incubators of political processes, the challenge ahead is to understand how and why 
modalities of action among refugees and the urban poor vary across places. In other 
words, the challenge ahead is to understand how and why, in certain places, like the 
Jalazon camp, the struggle against material deprivation becomes a privileged site for the 
expression of political rights-claims and the pursuit of collective action while, in other 
places, like the Arab districts of Lod, it is experienced as a practice that saps political 
energies and precludes associational action. The answer to these questions cannot be 
found in approaches that suggest a rigid dichotomy between camps and cities and 
between refugees and the urban poor.  
In this article, I have conceptualized both camps and cities as socio-spatial 
configurations that are shaped by continuous processes of negotiation over scarce 
material and symbolic resources. I have focused on the role of practices and discourses of 
control in this negotiation and I have pointed to the fact that both refugees and the urban 
poor negotiate their material and symbolic-political lives in the context of powerful and 
often hostile agencies of control (e.g. Wacquant 2014; Agier 2011). I have argued that a 
comparative approach to how different agencies of control shape both the distribution of 
resources and the space for political action in camps and cities is a promising approach 
for understanding variation in modalities of action among marginalized populations, 
paying particular attention to their articulation of material, symbolic, and political 
struggles (Fraser 2010). 
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This comparative approach to camps and cities resonates with recent attempts to look 
at camps through an urban lens, especially with Sanyal’s (2012, 2014) comparative work 
on spatial practices and politics among refugees and the urban poor in the Global South. 
However, it is more effective at challenging the dichotomy between camps and cities 
because, by adding a counterintuitive case of urban fragmentation and depoliticization, it 
de-essentializes the city rather than seeing it as a taken-for-granted pole of the urban-
political spectrum. The comparative approach here developed also opens up a new line of 
inquiry about how humanitarian agencies, state law-enforcement, and military agencies 
become entangled in both the material and symbolic worlds of camps and cities, and 
about the conditions under which these various agencies of control facilitate or hinder 
associational modalities of action. 
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Notes 
 
1 My use of “control” excludes informal social control, for example in the household or among peers. 
 
2 I use “urban citizens,” “minority citizens” and “the Palestinian urban poor” to refer to Palestinian citizens 
of Israel living as urban minorities in Lod. 
 
3 The data used in this article were produced through fourteen months of ethnographic fieldwork that I 
conducted within and across the refugee camp and the city in 2007-2008. I also repeatedly traveled across 
the Green Line, the “border” between Israel and the West Bank and visited several other West Bank 
refugee camps as well as other segregated Arab districts inside Israeli cities. 
 
4 While there are refugee and migrant populations living in cities, urban sociologists and geographers 
typically use the concept of “the urban poor” to refer to marginalized segments of the citizenry.   
 
5 With the goal of locating a major junction of the railway system in Western Lydda, the British mandate 
authority (1920-1948) had created a district there to house the British staff and the Palestinian train 
workers. In 1948 the Israeli army allowed about five hundred Palestinian rail workers and their families to 
stay in the district in order to continue to operate the trains. Roughly five hundred other Palestinians, 
mainly the elderly and those wounded in the fighting, were left in the old city. 
 
6 The United Nations established UNRWA in 1949 to help the approximately 750,000 Palestinian refugees 
displaced during the 1948 war. Palestinian refugees reached Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip. UNRWA operated and still operates today in these five areas. 
 
7 During its rule over the West Bank (1948-1967) the Jordanian state gave citizenship to the Palestinians 
living there, including Palestinian refugees, but placed them under tight military control. After the 1967 
war, the Israeli state established its military rule over the West Bank without extending its citizenship to the 
Palestinians living there. In 1988 Jordan relinquished any claim over the West Bank. 
 
8 Yiftachel (2006) uses the concept of “ethnocracy” to refer to a political regime that distributes resources 
and rights according to the ethnic membership of its citizens. “Ethnocratic” urban planning reorganizes the 
space in ways that privilege certain ethnic collectivities over others. In the case of Israeli cities with a 
sizeable Palestinian minority, the urban districts inhabited by Palestinians inside Israeli cities constitute 
 23 
                                                                                                                                                                     
“internal frontiers, into which Jewish presence should expand” or which need to be contained with the 
construction of Jewish Israeli neighborhoods around them (Yiftachel and Yacobi 2003, 679-680). 
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